“嗯，”男人说，“那有点陡峭。那边的那只微型火鸡怎么样？“”哦，我担心他的预算会更多延伸“，店主回答道。”那只火鸡售价500美元。“”什么！“客户说道。”怎么回事当鹦鹉可以说话时，土耳其的鹦鹉价格是鹦鹉的五倍，火鸡不能？ “啊，好吧，”店主说。 “鹦鹉可以说话，而火鸡不能说话。但那只火鸡是一种非凡的现象。他是一位哲学家。他可能不会说话，但他认为！当然，这里的笑话是关于火鸡的思考能力的说法是无法核实的，因为它没有以任何公开可观察的方式表现出来。各种形式的经验主义往往对任何此类主张持怀疑态度。在心灵哲学中，一种强有力的经验主义形式是行为主义。行为主义者认为所有关于“私人”，“内在”心理事件的讨论都应该转化为关于可观察行为（包括语言行为）的陈述。如果不能做到这一点，那么关于内心精神状态的主张是无法核实的，因此毫无意义，或者至少是不科学的。这样做的部分动机是让心理学更加科学 – 或至少更多的是“硬”科学，如物理学和化学，它们完全由客观现象的描述组成。然而，至少就行为主义的批评者而言，问题在于我们都非常清楚，我们不仅仅是表现出行为模式的自然界。我们有意识，主观性，被称为“诡辩”。否认这一点，或否认我们私人访问它可以成为知识的来源（例如关于我们的感受）是荒谬的。它导致了上述交换中出现的那种荒谬。现代哲学的一个典型问题是，我是否可以证明我相信其他人的主观经验与我的相似。这个笑话说明了一个重要的事实，即这是我们在生命早期获得的信念。女孩毫不怀疑宝宝感觉疼痛与她自己的疼痛相似。它也可能告诉我们一些关于我们如何达到这一信念的事情。有趣的是，女孩最后说的很可能是假的。宝宝可能只知道他的妹妹对他的头部造成了伤害。这可能足以阻止他将来拉扯她的头发。但是，在他不仅仅是务实地避免拔毛之前不会太久，并接受他为什么要避开它的标准解释。
Philosophy of mind is a rich field for jokes since quite a lot of humor is about the strangeness of being human and the difference between knowing something from the outside and knowing it from the inside (i.e. from a subjective perspective). Here are a few choice items. A man sees a parrot in a pet shop and asks how much it costs. “Well, he’s a good talker, says the owner, “so I can’t let him go for less than $100.” “Hmm,” says the man, “that ‘s a bit steep. How about that miniature turkey over there?” “Oh, I’m afraid he’d stretch your budget even more”, answers the owner. “That turkey sells for $500.” “What!” exclaims the customer. “How come the turkey’s five times the price of the parrot when the parrot can talk and the turkey can’t?” “Ah, well, “says the store owner. “It’s true the parrot can talk and the turkey can’t. But that turkey is a remarkable phenomenon. He’s a philosopher. He may not talk, but he thinks! The joke here, of course, is that the claim about the turkey’s ability to think is unverifiable since it doesn’t manifest itself in any way that is publicly observable. Empiricism in all its forms tends to be skeptical of any such claims. In the philosophy of mind, one robust form of empiricism is behaviorism. Behaviorists hold that all talk of “private”, “inner” mental events, should be translatable into statements about observable behavior (which includes linguistic behavior). If this can’t be done, then the claims about inner mental states are unverifiable and hence meaningless, or at least unscientific. Part of the motivation for doing this is to make psychology more scientific–or at least more the “hard” sciences such as physics and chemistry which consist entirely of descriptions of objective phenomena. The problem, though, at least as far as the critics of behaviorism are concerned, is that we all know perfectly well that we aren’t just a lump of nature exhibiting patterns of behavior. We have consciousness, subjectivity, what has been called an “inscape.” To deny this, or to deny that our private access to it can be a source of knowledge (e.g. about how we are feeling) is absurd. And it leads to the sort of absurdity captured in the above exchange. A classic problem of modern philosophy is whether I can justify my belief that other people have subjective experiences similar to mine. The joke illustrates the significant fact that this is a belief we acquire very early in life. The girl has no doubt that the baby feels pain similar to her own. It may also tell us something about how we arrive at this belief. Interestingly, what the girl says at the end is quite possibly false. The baby may only know that his sister did something to his head which hurt. That might be enough to stop him pulling her hair in future. But it won’t be too long before he goes beyond mere pragmatic avoidance of hair pulling and accepts the standard explanation of why he should he eschew it.