我们通过内省形成对自己心理状态的信念。内省如何工作将在下一节中讨论。但无论多么有效,哲学家们早已注意到这样一个事实,即每个人的内省能力似乎都将她置于一个独特的位置,以形成自己的心理状态的信念和知识。一个人对自己心理状态的内省信念在某种程度上比她对外部世界的信念更加安全,包括她对其他人心理状态的信念。相应地,她对自己心理状态的内省信念似乎比任何其他人可以形成的关于她的心理状态的信念更安全。在这些方面,对于我们在内省的基础上形成的信念,似乎存在一些认知特殊的东西。通常,这种特殊性被称为我们对自己心理状态的特权访问。要说一个人有权获得自己的心理状态,就是说她比其他任何人都更有能力获得关于他们的知识(或者可能是合理的信念)。但特权访问究竟是什么意思呢?在本节中,讨论了哲学家在这方面提出的众多不同主张。 (参见Alston 1971对这些和类似声明的特别全面的讨论。)

澳洲皇家墨尔本理工大学论文代写:反思的认识“特殊性”

We form beliefs about our own mental states by introspection. How exactly introspection works will be discussed in the next section. But however it works, philosophers have long taken note of the fact that each individual’s introspective capacity seems to place her in a unique position to form beliefs, and gain knowledge, of her own mental states. An individual’s introspective beliefs about her own mental states seem in some way more secure than her beliefs about the external world, including her beliefs about the mental states of other people. Correspondingly, her introspective beliefs about her own mental states seem more secure than the beliefs that anyone else could form about her mental states. In these ways, there seems to be something epistemically special about the beliefs that we form on the basis of introspection. Typically, this specialness has been referred to as the privileged access that we have to our own mental states. To say that an individual has privileged access to her own mental states is to say that she is in a better position than anyone else to acquire knowledge (or perhaps, justified beliefs) about them. But what exactly does privileged access amount to? In this section, of the numerous different claims that philosophers have made in this regard are discussed. (See Alston 1971 for a particularly comprehensive discussion of these and similar claims.)

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